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NEW ZEALAND’S FISCAL POLICY FRAMEWORK: EXPERIENCE AND 
EVOLUTION * 
1.  Introduction 
Over the past 15 years New Zealand has been paying considerable attention to the 
“rules of the game” for monetary, fiscal and regulatory policies.  This new focus has 
been an integral part of New Zealand’s economic reforms that have been well 
documented elsewhere and which have received considerable international attention.1  
 
Prior to 1985, New Zealand labour and product markets were extensively regulated, 
effective tax rates were high and variable, and production of a narrow range of traded 
products left the economy vulnerable to shifts in world demand and shocks to 
commodity prices.  A sustained period of fiscal deficits had seen a build-up in public 
debt, the current account deficit was close to 9% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
1986, and inflation and inflationary expectations were high.  
 
Institutional changes have separated and clarified the roles and responsibilities for 
monetary and fiscal policy.  The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1989 stipulates that 
the Bank is to formulate and implement monetary policy directed to the objective of 
achieving and maintaining stability in the general level of prices.  The Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 1994 aims to improve fiscal performance and management and to 
bring a long-term focus to budgeting.  
 
This paper discusses New Zealand’s fiscal policy framework, experience and evolution.  
The paper is set out as follows:  
 
•  Section 2 provides a brief fiscal history and describes the various factors 
influencing the development of the fiscal policy framework.  These factors include 
lessons from New Zealand’s fiscal history and broader public sector reform.   
 
•  Section 3 outlines the key institutional change, namely the Fiscal Responsibility Act 
1994.  
 
•  Section 4 compares the “fiscal rules” implied within New Zealand’s framework with 
those used internationally.  
 
•  Section 5 sets out the experience with the framework.  It includes a comparison of 
fiscal outcomes with fiscal objectives and sets out three key policy themes.  
                                                
*   Thanks to Michele Lloyd, Iain Rennie, Andrew Crisp, Bob Buckle, Struan Little, Renee Lister, 
Heather Kirkham, Brian McCulloch and Mark Blackmore for comments on earlier drafts of this 
paper. Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author. Thanks also to 
Brendon Riches for background material used in drafting Section 2.2. Earlier versions of this 
paper were presented at the Banca d’Italia Workshop on Fiscal Rules held in Perugia, February 
2001 and the New Zealand Association of Economists’ Conference, June 2001. Fiscal forecasts 
and fiscal objectives in the paper are those contained in the December Economic and Fiscal 
Update 2000 and the Budget Policy Statement 2001. Subsequent changes to the forecasts and 
objectives do not alter the analysis. Sections 6 and 7 draw on a companion Treasury Working 
Paper by Angela Barnes and Steve Leith.  
1 For example, see Bollard and Buckle (1987), Evans, Grimes and Wilkinson with Teece (1996), 
Silverstone, Bollard and Lattimore (1996). The latest IMF Article IV Staff Report and OECD 
Economic Survey provide further assessments, including recent policy developments.    4
 
•  Section 6 describes the evolution of fiscal forecasting and refinements to the 
Budget process.   
 
•  Section 7 summarises some of the challenges facing New Zealand’s fiscal policy 
framework and Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Background 
A series of reforms between 1984 and 1994 saw significant changes to the institutional 
arrangements governing fiscal policy in New Zealand.2  At a “macro” level, the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act (FRA) 1994 reflected a change in the focus of overall fiscal policy.  
The FRA needs to be set in the context of earlier “micro” reforms that altered the 
arrangements for management and decision-making in public sector organisations.   
Analysis of New Zealand’s fiscal history helps identify some of the key influences 
behind the institutional changes. 
 
2.1  Fiscal history 
New Zealand’s fiscal history is documented elsewhere, especially as a sub-set of the 
broader economic reform process (see for example Wells, 1987; 1996).  Some of the 
key themes include: 
 
•  Government expenditure on final goods and services, benefit transfers and debt 
servicing was below 30% of GDP in the 1960s and early 1970s.  By the early 
1990s the ratio had increased to around 40% of GDP.3   Average tax rates 
increased, but tax receipts lagged spending growth during the 1970s and 1980s.  
The rise in spending largely reflected rising benefit expenditures and higher debt 
servicing caused by persistent fiscal deficits (see Figure 1). 
 
•  Gross public debt increased from around 40% of GDP in 1974 to a peak of 78% in 
1987.  Net public debt was just below 5% of GDP in 1974, increasing to 52% of 
GDP in 1992.  The net public debt ratio declined in some years as privatisation 
proceeds were largely used to repay debt (see Section 5.1 below).  This reduction 
in the debt ratio from asset sales did not reflect a matching improvement in net 
worth.    
 
•  New Zealand’s sovereign credit rating was downgraded through the 1980s and 
early 1990s.  The Standard and Poor’s rating of triple A was removed in 1983 and 
was AA−  by 1991.    
 
•  In the 1970s and early 1980s New Zealand was a relatively active user of 
discretionary fiscal policy.  Over the period 1973 to 1984 New Zealand’s structural 
deficit increased by an average of 0.5% of GDP per year.  The standard deviation 
                                                
2 See “Putting it Together – An Explanatory Guide to the New Zealand Public Sector Financial 
Management System” (August, 1996) available at www.treasury.govt.nz. 
3 See the discussion of historical expenditure trends in the 1997 Budget Policy Statement. 
Information for this period is cash based. This information, together with all other data on fiscal 
outcomes reported in the text, is effectively for “central government” only.     5
of New Zealand’s structural deficit was the fourth highest in a sample of 19 OECD 
countries (Wheeler, 1991).  
 
 
Figure 1 −  Fiscal balance (% GDP) 
 
 
Source: Buckle, Kim and Tam (2001). 
Note: The fiscal variable used in this ratio is (central) government net cash flow from operations. It is on a 
March year basis up until 1989, June years from 1990 to 1999.  It differs from other long-run measures of 
the cash balance (e.g., “Table 2”) in that it excludes non-operating flows due to investing and financing 
activities. See Appendix Two in Buckle, Kim and Tam (2001) for details. From 1992 onward the series is 
the net cash flow from operations series in the Crown Financial Statements.  
 
 
In his assessment of New Zealand fiscal policy during the 1970s and 1980s, Wheeler 
(1991) concluded that: 
 
•  Extensive use of fiscal policy in a demand management role did not produce 
sustainable growth. 
 
•  Expansionary fiscal policy led to a rapid deterioration in the net debt position.4    
 
By the early 1990s, policy advice was oriented toward fiscal consolidation and a 
medium-term focus (see Treasury, 1990; Wheeler, 1991).  
 
 
2.2  Public sector management reform 
Public sector management reform provided Ministers with new tools for the 
examination of spending priorities amongst departments and for reviewing 
departmental efficiency (Treasury, 1990).  Two distinctive but overlapping sets of ideas 
                                                
4 For a further discussion on the role of discretionary fiscal policy in New Zealand see Deane 
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influenced this reform.  One derived from management theory, the other from 
institutional economics (the principal-agent issue).5 
 
Management reform was grounded on the principle that for public sector managers to 
be held responsible for results, they needed the freedom to allocate resources within a 
given budget and run their organisations without external ex ante control (subject to 
delivering the required quantity and quality of goods and services).  
 
Institutional economics suggested that the manager’s (or agent’s) interest might 
diverge from the owner’s (or principal’s) interest resulting in poor and inefficient 
outcomes.  To facilitate appropriate behaviour, ex-ante performance criteria for 
managers were specified with performance evaluation contingent on delivery.  
 
Three Acts cover the legislative framework underpinning the public sector management 
reforms.  
 
2.2.1  The State-owned Enterprises (SOE) Act 1986 
 
Where government services could be managed along commercial lines, the SOE Act 
allowed the Government to provide these services through organisational forms similar 
to private sector enterprises.  The SOE Act embodies principles of management 
autonomy, clarity of objectives and transparency of process.  Previously, SOEs had 
multiple and often conflicting objectives.  
 
2.2.2  The State Sector Act 1988 (SSA) 
The SSA established the accountability relationship between departmental chief 
executives and their Ministers.  Departmental chief executives were placed on 
renewable contracts.  These contracts made provision for annual performance 
agreements and made chief executives responsible for employing staff and 
determining their remuneration.  
 
2.2.3  The Public Finance Act 1989 (PFA) 
The PFA set out the way Parliament appropriates funds and gave chief executives 
powers and responsibilities in relation to financial management.  The Act imposed 
budgeting and reporting requirements for departments and the government as a whole.  
It also changed the basis of appropriation from inputs to outputs or services, and from a 
cash basis to an accrual basis.  
 
2.3  Fiscal policy reform 
The public sector management reforms altered institutional arrangements at a “micro” 
level with the intention of achieving a more efficient and accountable provision of 
government services.  The fiscal policy experience discussed in Section 2.1 above 
highlighted a number of broader fiscal policy lessons.  
First, the impact of fiscal policy on economic activity in the short-term was difficult to 
predict and New Zealand’s practical experience had not been positive.  In normal 
                                                
5 Clark and Sinclair (1986), Treasury (1987) and Holland and Boston (1990) provide further 
discussion of these ideas.    7
circumstances it was considered not desirable to make fiscal decisions with a view to 
managing real aggregate demand (Treasury, 1987).  
Second, the presence of some overarching target or ceiling was seen as a way of 
improving the control of public expenditure (Treasury, 1990).  For example, an 
overarching target could strengthen the incentives on Ministers to co-operate in setting 
priorities and to follow an agreed fiscal strategy.  However, it was recognised that such 
targets usually had no strong analytical basis and had disadvantages if interpreted 
mechanically (e.g., policy inflexibility).  
 
Third, better fiscal outcomes would require mechanisms for more regular information to 
the public on the medium-term fiscal outlook and the decisions that underpinned that 
outlook (Treasury, 1990).  
Although there are differences, notably in the ability to assign the implementation of 
monetary policy to an independent authority, some of the ideas that influenced the 
Reserve Bank Act 1989 also influenced the design of institutional arrangements 
surrounding fiscal policy.6  These ideas included the importance of transparency and 
credibility, and the need for institutional design to take into account the time 
consistency problem.7  
2.3.1  The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 (FRA) 
The FRA became effective from 1 July 1994 and reflected the lessons and thinking 
discussed above.  Importantly, the Act also codified a number of developments that 
had evolved in previous years, especially on the reporting and transparency side.   
These developments included the shift to Generally Accepted Accounting Practice 
(GAAP) together with the publication of regular short-term fiscal forecasts and a pre-
election economic and fiscal update.  The final form of the Act was shaped by the views 
of a select committee of Government and opposition members of parliament (see 
Report of the Finance and Expenditure Committee, 1994).  
 
As introduced, the Finance and Expenditure Committee saw the Fiscal Responsibility 
bill as neutral with respect to the fiscal stance that a government might choose to 
adopt.  However, the Government would be required to provide a fiscal strategy report 
that would set out overall fiscal objectives and ten-year (minimum) fiscal projections.  
The Committee determined that the weight of evidence presented to it supported the 
view that transparency alone was insufficient and recommended that the bill be 
strengthened in three ways:  
•  Inclusion of legislated principles of responsible fiscal management.  
 
•  Publication of a Budget Policy Statement.  
                                                
6  The Reserve Bank Act 1989 sets out the objective of price stability. The precise target of 
monetary policy and the definition of price stability are set out in the Policy Targets Agreement 
(PTA). The PTA is an agreement between the Reserve Bank and the Minister of Finance. The 
Bank has “instrument independence” and its Governor is accountable for achieving the targets 
set out in the PTA. See Reddell (1999) for a discussion of how the public sector management 
reforms discussed in Section 2.2 influenced the formulation of institutional arrangements for 
monetary policy.  
7 See for example, Chari, Kehoe and Prescott (1988).    8
 
•  Providing for the Budget Policy Statement and other reports required under the 
legislation to be referred to a parliamentary committee.  
 
Although the Committee considered the role of mandatory targets, the then 
Government rejected them, giving the following reasons (see Report of the Finance 
and Expenditure Committee, 1994, pp.13-14):  
 
•  There is no solid theoretical justification for any particular fiscal target that can be 
maintained over a period of time.  Judgements on the appropriate level of fiscal 
aggregates vary over time and depend on the economic circumstances currently 
prevailing.  
 
•  Other countries’ experience of legislated targets suggests that there are 
substantial risks attached to their use.  In particular, rigid adherence can seriously 
distort decision-making and, unless carefully handled, minor variations from target 
can result in significant but unnecessary damage to credibility.  
 
•  Their inherent inflexibility makes it difficult for fiscal policy to respond appropriately 
to the inevitable volatility of economic circumstances.  While targets in principle 
could be expressed in cyclically-adjusted terms, in practice these are difficult to 
measure effectively.  
 
•  Despite the advances made in terms of the availability and transparency of fiscal 
information, human ingenuity has yet to find a way of specifying fiscal targets that 
cannot be effectively and often comprehensively evaded.  Furthermore, without the 
political will to achieve targets, ways are inevitably found to avoid them.  
 
The Committee considered that legislated principles provided a number of advantages 
over mandatory targets.  These included the encouragement of a medium to long-term 
perspective with recognition that governments may have to depart from the principles, 
but requiring this to be justified.  It was also considered important that institutional 
change designed to improve fiscal performance should be sufficiently “flexible” so as to 
endure through the shift to a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system.8  
 
The FRA does not prescribe fiscal targets in legislation.  However, it does require 
Governments to set short-term fiscal intentions and long-term fiscal objectives (see 
Section 3.2 below).  Short-term fiscal intentions for key aggregates still create issues 
when interpreting results given cyclical changes and valuation changes.  These issues 
explain further evolution of the framework, including the role of the fiscal provisions as 
a key anchor in the short-term (see Section 6).  
                                                
8 The New Zealand electoral system changed from First Past the Post to MMP in 1995, 
following a referendum in 1993. The 1996 election was the first to be held under MMP.    9
 
3.  The Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 
The FRA aims to improve fiscal policy by specifying principles of responsible fiscal 
management and strengthening reporting requirements.9   
 
3.1  Principles of responsible fiscal management 
Governments are required to follow a legislated set of principles and publicly assess 
their fiscal policies against these principles.  Governments may depart temporarily from 
the principles but must do so publicly, explain why they have departed, and indicate 
how and when they intend to conform to the principles.  The five principles of 
responsible fiscal management are: 
 
(a)  Reducing total Crown debt to prudent levels so as to provide a buffer against 
factors that may impact adversely on the level of total Crown debt in the future, 
by ensuring that, until such levels have been achieved, the total operating 
expenses of the Crown in each financial year are less than its total operating 
revenues in the same financial year.  
 
(b)  Once prudent levels of total Crown debt have been achieved, maintaining these 
levels by ensuring that, on average, over a reasonable period of time, the total 
operating expenses of the Crown do not exceed its total operating revenues.  
 
(c)  Achieving and maintaining levels of Crown net worth that provide a buffer against 
factors that may impact adversely on the Crown’s net worth in the future.  
 
(d)  Managing prudently the fiscal risks facing the Crown.  
 
(e)  Pursuing policies that are consistent with a reasonable degree of predictability 
about the level and stability of tax rates for future years.  
 
Definitions such as “prudent” level of debt, or “reasonable” degree of predictability are 
not specified in the Act.  It is left to the Government of the day to interpret the relevant 
fiscal terms.  
 
Importantly, although a Government can depart from the principles, the FRA requires 
any such departure to be temporary and that the Minister of Finance specify the 
reasons for departure, the approach to be taken to return to the principles and the 
period of time this is expected to take.    
 
3.2  Reporting requirements 
Governments must publish a Budget Policy Statement (BPS) before the annual Budget 
and a Fiscal Strategy Report (FSR) at the time of the Budget (see Box 1).  These 
publications must demonstrate the consistency of the Government’s short-term fiscal 
intentions and long-term fiscal objectives with the principles of responsible fiscal 
management (Table 1 provides more detail).  The Act requires the FSR to include fiscal 
                                                
9 See “Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 – An Explanation” (September, 1995) available at 
www.treasury.govt.nz.   10
projections (the “Progress Outlooks”) covering a minimum of 10 years for the variables 
specified as long-term fiscal objectives.10 
 
The Treasury is required to prepare regular economic and fiscal forecasts (see Box 1).  
Having the timing and broad nature of the overall forecasts specified in legislation 
raises their credibility.   
 
Under the FRA, all financial statements included in reports required by the Act are 
prepared under Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (GAAP).  Fiscal reporting 
follows a set of consistent accounting rules established independently by the 
Accounting Standards Review Board (which sets accounting standards that are 
mandatory for both the public and private sector).  The use of accrual accounts means 
that the full cost of policy must be disclosed, including non-cash items like depreciation 
and changes to government employee pension rights.11  The predecessor of GAAP 
was “Table 2” which was prepared on a cash basis.  
 
GAAP provides externally set and audited standards and helps avoid some of the 
boundary problems that affected previous fiscal forecasts (e.g., the treatment of 
forestry cutting rights in the early 1990s).   
 
The economic and fiscal forecasts are based on the Treasury’s best professional 
judgement about the impact of policy, rather than relying on the judgement of the 
Government.  The FRA requires the Minister of Finance to communicate all of the 
Government’s policy decisions to the Treasury.  The fiscal forecasts are also required 
to disclose contingent liabilities and other specific fiscal risks.  
 
Finally, all reports required under the Act are referred to a parliamentary select 
committee that comprises representatives from the Government and opposition parties.  
                                                
10 The BPS and FSR are Government documents. The Progress Outlooks contained in the 
FSR use economic assumptions determined by the Treasury and fiscal assumptions agreed by 
the Government. The first years of the Progress Outlooks are the short-term fiscal forecasts. 
Beyond the forecast horizon, the Outlooks ignore cyclical effects and so the projected fiscal 
position is structural.  
11 In addition to a range of other financial statements, the Crown produces a statement of 
financial performance (operating statement), a statement of financial position (balance sheet), a 
statement of cash flows and a statement of borrowing. This provides a comprehensive set of 
accounts that reconcile operating, cash and balance sheet statements.    11
 
Table 1 −−−−  Short-term fiscal intentions, long-term fiscal objectives, and principles of 
responsible fiscal management 
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Fiscal provisions (see 
Section 6 in text) 
     
         
* As a set, the principles endure with the Act. However, individual principles do not contain 
explicit time horizons. 
 
 
3.3  The credibility of fiscal policy 
Setting long-term fiscal objectives and ensuring consistency of short-term intentions 
with these requires governments to consider the long-term consequences of their 
decisions, including longer-term sustainability.   
 
Overall, the FRA approaches the time consistency issue from the interaction of the 
long-term fiscal objectives, the short-term fiscal intentions and the longer-term fiscal 
projections.  The credibility of fiscal policy will be undermined by: 
 
•  fiscal outcomes that consistently deviate from the stated path, or 
 
•  fiscal projections indicating objectives will not be met over a reasonable period of 
time given plausible economic and policy assumptions.   
   12
The longer-term fiscal projections provide a guide to the broad sustainability of fiscal 
policy.  For example, an assumed tax reduction (spending increase) without a change 
to spending (tax) assumptions could see a rising debt profile through time.  Although a 
Government could signal a future reduction in spending (increase in taxes), the 
projections increase the transparency around the implied policy change.         
  
 
Box 1 −  Key reports required under the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994 
The Budget Policy Statement is published by the end of March and is required to set out:12  
•  Long-term fiscal objectives for Crown operating expenses, revenues and balance, debt and 
net worth.  
•  Short-term fiscal intentions for the above variables for the Budget year and the following two 
financial years.  
•  Broad strategic priorities for the coming Budget.  
The Fiscal Strategy Report is tabled with the Budget and must include:  
•  A comparison of the fiscal forecasts in the Budget Economic and Fiscal Update with the 
short-term fiscal intentions in the BPS.  
•  Progress Outlook projections for ten or more years of the variables specified for the long-
term fiscal objectives.  
•  Assessment of the Progress Outlooks with the long-term fiscal objectives in the BPS.  
Inconsistencies between the BPS and/or the FSR and the immediately preceding Statement or 
Report must be explained and justified by the Government.  
The Treasury is required to prepare:  
•  An Economic and Fiscal Update at the time of the Budget and each December.  
•  A Pre-election Economic and Fiscal Update before each general election.  
The Updates provide short-term forecasts for variables such as GDP, consumer price inflation, 
unemployment and the current account of the balance of payments.  Fiscal information includes 
forecasts of the Crown financial statements. 
 
                                                
12 Fiscal years begin 1 July and the Budget must be presented by the end of July each year.    13
4.  International Developments on Fiscal Policy Frameworks 
The 1990s saw the development of a variety of fiscal policy frameworks internationally, 
including the Code for Fiscal Stability in the United Kingdom and the Australian Charter 
of Budget Honesty.  The Maastricht Treaty imposes a deficit ceiling and a debt limit.  
The Stability and Growth Pact specifies particular circumstances where a deficit can be 
regarded as excessive.   
 
In terms of reconciling short-run movements in deficits and debt ratios with long-term 
commitments, the OECD (1998) examines the potential role for limits such as the 
“golden rule” and “deficit or debt ceilings”.  The following sections compare and 
contrast some of these mechanisms with those implied in New Zealand’s fiscal policy 
framework.   
 
4.1  The golden rule 
The golden rule links increases in debt to public investment.  For example, the United 
Kingdom’s golden rule requires current receipts to equal current expenditure over the 
economic cycle so that over a cycle the government borrows only for (net) 
investment.13  The OECD (1998) suggests that although a golden rule may offer 
benefits through tax-smoothing, it requires a clear definition of public capital formation 
and strong public financial accounting standards.  
 
The FRA principles of responsible fiscal management reflect a golden rule approach.  
Principle (b) requires balance between operating revenues and expenses (which are 
inclusive of depreciation) over a “reasonable period of time”.  This can, and has been 
interpreted as implying that the economic cycle is the appropriate period over which to 
balance the budget (see Wells, 1996).  In practice, there are difficulties in measuring 
the economic cycle and the underlying fiscal position.  Principle (e), pursuing policies 
consistent with a reasonable degree of predictability about the level and stability of tax 
rates, also acknowledges tax-smoothing arguments.  
 
4.2  Deficit ceilings 
Specific deficit ceilings are a feature of the Maastricht Treaty.  Dalsgaard and de 
Serres (1999) have estimated “safe” budget balances for a group of European Union 
countries.  These “safe” budgets are the target needed to ensure, at a given level of 
probability, that the three percent deficit limit required by the Maastricht Treaty is not 
breached over a particular time horizon.  The estimated safe budgets are based on 
model estimates of the effect of disturbances on the fiscal position.  
 
Under the FRA, short-term fiscal intentions are set by the current Government and 
must be consistent with objectives and principles.  Short-term intentions have 
previously been expressed in terms of specific numerical targets.  For example, 
“achieving fiscal surpluses of at least 3% of GDP” to provide a cushion for adverse 
events (see the 1996 BPS).  More recently, the short-term fiscal intentions have tended 
to reflect the fiscal forecasts.   
 
Along similar lines to the Dalsgaard and de Serres study, preliminary work by Buckle, 
Kim and Tam (2001) develops a procedure for identifying the ex ante fiscal balance 
                                                
13 Buiter (2001) provides further analysis of the UK golden rule. Note that both the UK and New 
Zealand also have debt goals.    14
required to achieve, with a given probability, a desired ex post budget balance for 
alternative time horizons.14  The analysis indicates that to avoid a budget deficit at a 
95% confidence interval, the (average) annual ex ante budget balance for New 
Zealand should be set at a surplus of 1.5% of GDP if the fiscal planning horizon is one 
year.  This target rises to 1.8% and 2% of GDP for horizons of two and three years 
respectively as the probability of adverse shocks increases and the propagation 
process becomes more pronounced.  
 
4.3  Debt ceilings 
Unlike the Maastricht Treaty, the FRA does not prescribe numerical targets for debt.  
The “prudent” level of debt is not specified in the legislation and it is left up to the 
Government of the day to interpret the relevant level.  The Act (implicitly) accepts that a 
range of factors will influence prudent debt levels, including the nature of likely shocks, 
structural features of the economy, the nature of the Crown’s balance sheet and future 
developments affecting spending and taxes.  
 
Credit Suisse First Boston (1995) analyse the “optimal debt” question given the key 
characteristics of the New Zealand economy (i.e., small, open, presence of distorting 
taxes, openness to world capital markets, emigration and local demographics).  In a 
deterministic setting they conclude that current and capital spending plans should be 
determined independently of the debt decision. Optimal tax policy would plan for a 
constant average tax rate through all future periods.  
 
However, the judgement in the mid-1990s was that New Zealand’s debt levels were 
imposing significant economic costs and debt reduction was a policy priority.  One of 
the practical considerations influencing the specification of long-term debt objectives 
into the future is the approach taken to the fiscal consequences of population ageing 
(see Section 7.8 below).  
 
4.4  Conservative assumptions 
Prudent or conservative economic assumptions have been used in a number of 
countries to avoid the problem of overestimating the strength of the fiscal position.15  
Canada provides an example where fiscal targets have been set with projections based 
on “conservative” economic assumptions and a contingency reserve.  For the purposes 
of projecting the public finances on a “cautious and prudent basis”, the United Kingdom 
has assumed trend rates of economic growth that differ from what might be considered 
the neutral estimate.  
 
Although such assumptions may generate initial credibility benefits, once credibility is 
established financial markets are likely to adjust their expectations.  They could 
therefore incorporate the degree of conservative bias and assess governments relative 
to this bias-adjusted outlook.  Similarly, spending Ministers and departments are also 
likely to adjust their actions through time to offset the bias.  The FRA requires short-
                                                
14 A structural vector auto-regression is estimated over the period 1971 to 1999 and includes 
real GDP, the fiscal balance-to-GDP ratio, the sum of real private consumption and real private 
investment, and the GDP deflator. Due to data limitations, the fiscal variable uses net cash flows 
from operations rather than the operating balance. The ex ante targets cited here are based on 
simulations where fiscal policy shocks are “switched off”. 
15 OECD (1998, Annex 2).    15
term forecast and medium-term projection assumptions, and hence any safety margins, 
to be published.  
 
5.  Experience with New Zealand’s Fiscal Policy Framework 
Fiscal outcomes over the 1990s provide insights into the strengths and weaknesses of 
the fiscal policy framework.   
 
5.1  Fiscal outcomes 
New Zealand’s fiscal position improved substantially during the first half of the 1990s.  
To gauge the extent to which the economic cycle influenced the fiscal position, Figure 2 
provides an estimate of the cyclically-adjusted, or structural balance.   
 
With revenue remaining broadly stable as a share of GDP, the change in the fiscal 
balance was achieved largely through the expense side.   
 
The decline in expenses partly reflects lower finance costs as interest rates fell, and 
fiscal surpluses and asset sales reduced the level of debt.  (Expenses excluding 
finance costs were around 38% of GDP in 1992 and 32% of GDP in 2000.)   
Approximately NZ$19.2 billion was raised from the sale of government businesses and 
other assets between 1987 and 1999.  Proceeds contributed to the repayment of public 
debt, and a zero net-foreign currency debt goal was reached in 1996.  Progress against 
stated long-term objectives for net debt is given in Figure 3.16  
 
Although significant progress was made in reducing operating expenses as a share of 
GDP from the levels evident in the early 1990s (see Figure 4), progress against the 
stated long-term objective stalled during the mid- to late-1990s.17   
 
In addition to the decline in finance costs, the decline in expenses through the 1990s 
also partly reflects the economic upswing and the associated fall in unemployment 
benefit expenses.  The increase in the age of eligibility for New Zealand 
Superannuation (NZS) and fiscal discipline in the core public sector also contributed to 
the decline in expenses-to-GDP.  Changes in the profile of the major components of 
total expenses (by functional classification) are illustrated in Figure 5.
                                                
16 The general trend in net debt tends to match operating balance trends. However, the 
operating balance is an accrual measure and recognises non-cash items (e.g., retained surplus 
of SOEs and Crown entities). The relationship between net debt and the operating balance is 
reconciled in each Economic and Fiscal Update. The 1994 FSR expressed the long-term 
objective for net debt as between 20% and 30% of GDP. This was changed to below 20% of 
GDP in the 1995 BPS and to 15% of GDP in the 1998 FSR. An objective for gross debt was 
introduced in the 1997 BPS and is currently 30% of GDP.  The current formulation of the net 
debt objective is 20% of GDP (excluding assets accumulated for the purpose of funding future 
public pension expenses).   
17 The long-term objective for expenses was changed in the 2000 BPS to “Expenses around 
current levels of 35% of GDP”.  Note that the historical trend in expenses is somewhat distorted 
by the effects of valuation changes and foreign exchange losses/gains (see Note to Figure 2). 
For example, foreign exchange losses in 1992 were around $1.8 billion (2.4% of GDP).    16
 
 
Figure 2 - Operating balance and cyclically-adjusted operating balance: Estimate and 
forecasts (June years, % GDP)  
 
Source: The Treasury, December Economic and Fiscal Update, 2000. 
Note: This analysis removes the effect of valuation changes (including changes to the liability of 
the pension scheme for government employees, the liability of the accident compensation 
scheme, losses/gains on sale of assets, and foreign exchange losses/gains). The estimate 
requires assumptions about potential output and the responsiveness of revenues and 
unemployment expenses to output. These assumptions are based on, and are sensitive to the 
latest available information. The estimate of potential output is derived using a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter.    
 
Figure 3 - Net Crown debt: Actual and forecasts (June years, % GDP) 
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Figure 4 - Expenses: Actual and forecasts (June years, % GDP) 
 
 
Source: The Treasury, December Economic and Fiscal Update, 2000. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Expenses: Functional components (June years, % GDP) 
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Long-term Objective   18
Longer-term (10-year) fiscal projections in the mid-1990s suggested rapid progress 
toward the then long-term fiscal objectives.  For example, the baseline projection in the 
1996 FSR indicated the elimination of net debt by 2001/02.  This degree of debt 
reduction (and eventual asset accumulation) represented a higher level of government 
saving than the then Government considered desirable.  A “structural” fiscal correction 
aimed at longer-term economic and social objectives became an option.  Personal 
income tax reductions and additional spending plans were announced in early 1996.  
This structural correction was predicated on relatively strong assumptions regarding 
expenditure control that are discussed below and in Section 6.2.   
 
5.2  Key themes from the experience of the 1990s  
Three key themes emerge from the experience with the fiscal framework during the 
1990s.  
 
5.2.1  Setting and achieving long-term fiscal objectives 
The FRA does not specify the timeframe for the long-term fiscal objectives and in 
practice the implicit timeframes for the objectives were different.18  For example, when 
debt was at relatively high levels in the early 1990s, the focus was on the debt and 
operating balance objectives rather than the expense objective.  Debt and operating 
balance objectives could be met with a range of possible revenue and expense tracks.  
 
As noted above, progress against the stated expense objective slowed during the mid- 
to late-1990s.  Indeed, even if the 30% of GDP objective had been reached it was not 
clear that it could be sustained given the projected demographic changes that would 
begin to emerge after around 2010.    
 
The implicit timeframes associated with the long-term fiscal objectives during the 1990s 
reflect an over-specification issue within the FRA (the requirement to specify long-term 
objectives for expenses, revenues, the operating balance, debt, and net worth).   The 
FRA does not specify which variable is the binding constraint nor does it require 
governments to explicitly state a preference ranking.   
 
5.2.2  An increasing  focus on longer-term fiscal issues 
The second half of the 1990s saw an increasing focus on longer-term fiscal issues.  
This was assisted by the shift to a more sustainable fiscal position and more 
information on the implications of demographic change, in particular, the consequences 
of population ageing for public pensions and health spending.19     
                                                
18 The framework does not preclude a government from specifying a particular time frame or 
convergence path toward long-term objectives. 
19 50-year spending scenarios have generally been included in each Fiscal Strategy Report 
(with the first report published in 1994). The potential consequences of population ageing on the 
longer-term fiscal position were a factor influencing the debt reduction strategy during the first 
half of the 1990s.      19
 
Further detail is provided in Section 7.8, but examples of this longer-term focus include: 
 
•  Reports on retirement income policy (e.g., Periodic Report Group, 1997).  The 
1997 Report reviewed the framework for private and public provision and included 
long-term projections of NZS costs.   
 
•  The 1997 referendum on a compulsory Retirement Savings Scheme (RSS). 
 
•  A comparison of alternative financing methods in the 1999 Fiscal Strategy Report 
(“tax-smoothing” versus “balanced budgets”). 
 
•  The establishment of a Superannuation Task Force in late 1999 (disestablished in 
2000). 
 
•  The proposed New Zealand Superannuation Fund, which is giving effect to a tax-
smoothing approach for a part of future public pension expenses. 20  
 
5.2.3  Setting short-term fiscal policy 
Changes to fiscal policy settings in the mid-1990s involved some difficult judgements 
about short-term pressures on aggregate demand, the size of supply-side responses 
(primarily through labour supply) and likely spending increases.  
 
The size and timing of tax reductions depended on a number of conditions being met.  
These included net debt being under 30% of GDP and no risk of a return to fiscal 
deficits in the foreseeable future.  The conditions also included the avoidance of 
balance of payments and inflationary pressures (see FSR 1995).   
 
The Treasury and Reserve Bank assessments were that the outlook for aggregate 
demand was such that tax reductions could be accommodated without causing 
significant inflationary pressures.  However, the economy evolved differently from the 
initial assessment with aggregate demand stronger than expected in 1996.21  The 
episode provides an example of the complex issues involved when adjusting fiscal 
policy in an environment of uncertainty about the evolving nature of the economy.  
 
Furthermore, pre-1997 forecasting assumptions for expenses involved a tension 
between setting appropriate assumptions for macroeconomic management purposes 
(e.g., impact on aggregate demand) and the political economy of incorporating a 
specific amount for new spending (e.g., an explicit amount might set a “floor” rather 
than a “ceiling” on spending demands).   
 
Valuation changes and cyclical movements also complicated the interpretation of short-
term intentions for fiscal aggregates against outcomes.  In particular, the pension 
scheme for government employees and the outstanding claims liability of the accident 
compensation scheme fluctuate from year to year due to changes in long-term financial 
assumptions and other factors.  For example, movements to the liability valuations for 
                                                
20 Details are available at www.treasury.govt.nz/release/super.  
21 See the Reserve Bank of New Zealand submission to the Independent Review of the 
Operation of Monetary Policy, supporting document on “Fiscal and monetary coordination” 
(www.rbnz.govt.nz/monpol/review).   20
these two items boosted the operating balance in 1999/2000 by around $700 million 
(the actual operating balance was $1.5 billion or 1.4% of GDP).  
 
By the late 1990s, debt-to-GDP ratios were significantly lower and there was increased 
scope to allow for the operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers.  Policy-makers were in a 
better position to assess the nature and likely duration of economic shocks.22  
Nonetheless, the maintenance of operating surpluses was seen as important given the 
size of New Zealand’s current account deficit and net external liabilities.  For example, 
the Asian financial crisis saw the then Government make incremental adjustments to 
short-term fiscal plans during 1998 as new information emerged.  
 
By the time of the 1999 BPS (published in December 1998), longer-term fiscal 
projections indicated four years of fiscal deficits.  Although the fiscal position was 
projected to eventually move into surplus, there was a limited “buffer” against further 
adverse events and the achievement of longer-term debt and expense objectives was 
pushed out.  The “Policies for Progress” programme included steps to improve the 
medium-term economic and fiscal outlook.    
 
6.  The Evolution of Fiscal Forecasting and Budget Processes 
In response to the experience with the framework in the mid-1990s, there have been 
refinements to fiscal forecasting and Budget processes.  The following description on 
the top-down management of government spending is drawn from Barnes and Leith 
(2001).  The two key tools for ensuring overall fiscal control and effectiveness are fixed 
nominal baselines for departmental spending and the fiscal provisions framework.  
 
6.1  Fixed nominal baselines 
The early 1990s saw a change whereby Government spending could be characterised 
as being split into two tracks: “formula-driven” (i.e. indexed) and “fixed” (i.e. no change 
to nominal baseline amounts).  Previously, departmental funding was split into three 
main input-based streams: personnel, operating costs and capital.  Personnel costs 
were regularly adjusted for movements in wages, and the other two streams were 
generally adjusted annually to reflect expected cost movements.  The Public Finance 
Act enabled a baseline approach.  
 
Formula driven indexation applies to non-departmental spending on benefits (e.g., 
inflation indexation of unemployment payments) and to New Zealand Superannuation.  
Health and education spending are adjusted through formulas that take into account 
demographic change.  A specific policy decision is required to change the amount 
spent on non-indexed spending.   
 
6.2  Forecasting assumptions 
A key issue to emerge from these changes was the relationship between fixed nominal 
baselines and the short-term fiscal forecasts.  Three-year budget forecasts prepared 
under GAAP between 1994 and 1996 would include increases in government spending 
                                                
22 See Fowlie (1999) for a discussion on the operation of automatic fiscal stabilisers and their 
relationship with the FRA. Tam and Kirkham (2001) provide further analysis on the calculation 
and size of automatic fiscal stabilisers.    21
only for those areas affected by indexation.  All other spending was assumed to remain 
constant over time.  
 
This approach provided what might be described as a policy neutral forecast.  Cost 
pressures and new initiatives were “assumed” in the forecasts to be funded from 
savings and efficiency gains.  However, because the fiscal forecasts did not allow for 
new spending in future Budgets, they understated the likely spending profiles.  An 
example of this “forecast bias” is illustrated in Table 2 below.23  The left-hand column 
sets out the forecasts for the 1997/98 year operating balance at different points in time, 
starting from the first time it was forecast through to the actual result.  The right-hand 
column decomposes the change into its forecasting and policy components. The 
“forecasting” component includes changes attributable to different macroeconomic 
conditions than forecast, and revised tax and welfare bases.24 
 
The analysis indicates that there was significant policy change ($3.7 billion) with 
respect to the forecast assumption.  This “slippage” against forecast reflects the 
tension mentioned in Section 5.2.3 −  between setting realistic assumptions and the 
political economy of incorporating a specific amount for new spending.  
   
 
Table 2 −−−−  Operating balance for 1997/98: forecast and policy changes 
 
Forecast 1997/98 
operating balance ($billion) 
 
Policy and Forecast changes from 
 1994 DEFU to actual result ($billion)* 
 
1994 DEFU   7.6 
 
   Revenue: Policy  −  1.0   
1995 Budget   7.8 
 
   Revenue: Forecasting  −  1.1   
1996 Budget   3.3 
 
   Expenses: Policy  −  2.7   
1997 Budget   1.5 
 
   Expenses: Forecasting  −  0.6   
1998 Budget   2.8 
 
   SOE/CE surplus: Policy         −    
1998 Actual   2.5 
 
   SOE/CE surplus: Forecasting  0.2   
      Total: Policy  −  3.7   
      Total: Forecasting  −  1.5   
Actual less DEFU forecast 
 
−  5.1     −  5.2 
 
 
* Change is expressed in terms of the impact on the operating balance. DEFU refers to December 
Economic and Fiscal Update. CE refers to Crown entity. Totals do not sum due to rounding.  
 
Source: Adapted from Table 1.4, OECD (1999). 
 
                                                
23 If fixed nominal baselines and indexed spending are strictly interpreted as representing 
current policy, then increases in spending reflect a change in fiscal policy rather than “forecast 
bias”.       
24 Some of the forecasting change may reflect changes in fiscal policy and so could arguably 
be allocated to the policy change component. The decomposition used does not allow for these 
effects.   22
 
 
The approach resulted in optimistic projections of progress towards the long-term fiscal 
objectives.25  This created a number of issues, including those mentioned previously 
around macroeconomic management as well as discipline on the annual Budget 
process.  Further, the approach raised credibility problems about likely progress 
towards long-term fiscal goals (see for example, OECD, 1999).  
 
On the political side, there were also pressures to find a better way to represent 
spending intentions.  For example, New Zealand’s first coalition government sought a 
mechanism to demonstrate fiscal prudence and reduce the possibility that portfolio 
Ministers from different coalition parties would bid up spending in their sector. The 
response was a statement incorporated into the Coalition Agreement committing to a 
(cumulative) $5 billion cap on new spending over a three-year term of government to 
1999/2000.  
 
Importantly, this cap was on top of expenses already included in the fiscal forecasts 
(i.e. on top of the fixed nominal baselines and formula-driven indexed items).  The cap 
evolved into a mechanism now known as the fiscal provisions.  
 
6.3  Fiscal provisions 
The fiscal provisions were introduced into the forecasts during the 1997 Budget.26 The 
provisions framework consists of a pre-determined fiscal limit across the parliamentary 
cycle (three years), and a set of rules for “counting" against that limit.  
 
The operating provisions are recorded in the Statement of Financial Performance as 
expenses.  However, they are available for decisions that relate to changes in revenue, 
expenses or the surpluses of SOEs and Crown entities.   The provision is defined as a 
cumulative, three-year total.  For example, a decision taken to increase a department’s 
baseline in 2000/01 will generally represent a permanent increase (i.e., annual 
increases “roll out” into the following years). 
 
A capital provision, which links to the Government’s debt objectives, exists alongside 
the operating provisions.  The capital provision covers both physical assets and 
financial assets (e.g., loans).  The provision generally provides for new investments or 
where maintaining current operations cannot be funded from accumulated depreciation 
on balance sheets.  The provision also covers capital savings, including capital 
withdrawals (special dividends) from SOEs and Crown entities.  
 
Establishing fiscal provisions requires a Government to consider its long-term 
objectives for the operating balance, debt reduction/asset accumulation, and future 
expense pressures.   
 
                                                
25 The Progress Outlooks in Fiscal Strategy Reports did include higher spending scenarios and 
so provided some indication of alternative paths towards stated long-term fiscal objectives.  
26 Repeating the analysis in Table 2 for the 1999/2000 operating balance (first forecast in the 
1996 Pre-Election Economic and Fiscal Update) yields an actual less forecast difference of 
minus $5 billion. This comprises a forecasting difference of $2.2 billion and a policy difference of 
$2.8 billion. This policy difference is lower than that in Table 2 ($3.7 billion), reflecting the 
increasing role of the provision after 1997.            23
6.3.1  Operating provisions  
The operating provisions focus on the operating balance impact of changes to existing 
policy (including cost increases) or the introduction of new policy.  The framework 
focuses on decision-making and, therefore, only discrete policy decisions.27  The focus 
on discrete policy changes builds on and extends the past practice of having fixed 
nominal baselines for most departmental spending, while allowing forecasting changes 
to fluctuate with the state of the economy.  
 
The provision requires principles that determine which items will be treated as forecast 
changes, and which would be treated as specific policy decisions that “count”.  The 
development of the principles has evolved considerably since the framework was 
introduced (for details, see Barnes and Leith, 2001).  
 
The operating provisions are not a direct mechanism to control the operating balance in 
the short-term.  For example, under accrual accounting there are fluctuations due to 
liability valuations.  
 
The effects of the economic cycle are also beyond the immediate control of the 
Government.  The general approach taken is that as forecasts change through time, 
the fiscal provision limit is unaltered.  This allows other fiscal variables to change as the 
automatic fiscal stabilisers operate through the cycle.  Analysis for New Zealand 
indicates that cyclical effects operate mainly through the revenue side.  Unemployment 
is the major cyclical expense.   
 
Beyond the three-year parliamentary cycle, the fiscal forecasts have included “technical 
provision/s” to represent potential future policy decisions to be made as part of future 
Budgets.28   
 
The Government’s operating provision at the time of the December Economic and 
Fiscal Update 2000 was $5.9 billion (inclusive of Goods and Services Tax, GST).  The 
provision is phased across the three year period  in accordance with the expected 
profile of policy decisions.  (The $5.9 billion provision covers four years as the election 
was held in November 1999, and the new Government undertook a number of 
initiatives in the 1999/2000 year.)  
 
The provision was based on the Government’s broad fiscal goals and the most recent 
set of fiscal forecasts (those in the Pre-Election Economic and Fiscal Update, October 
1999. See Barnes and Leith 2001 for details). Figure 6 provides a graphical 
representation and Table 3 details the dollar amounts.  
                                                
27 For example, an increase in benefit payments due to higher unemployment would not impact 
on the provisions. In contrast, a decision to increase the amount of the benefit payment (over 
and above any automatic inflation indexation) would impact on the provisions. 
28 In the current Progress Outlooks the amount assumed beyond the fiscal forecast horizon is 
termed a “fiscal allowance” and provides a broad indication of fiscal flexibility rather than a 
specific policy commitment. The Outlooks also include an allowance for capital.    24
 
Figure 6 −   Fiscal provision allocation as at December Economic and Fiscal 
Update, 2000 (June years, $ millions) 
 





Table 3 −−−−  Fiscal provisions as at December Economic and Fiscal Update, 2000 
 
Operating provisions 









Budget  2000  decisions  420 1,050 1,060 1,120  3,650 
Inter-Budget contingency*  −   161 136 138  435 
Budget 2001 provision  −   −   600 600  1,200 















* Within Budget 2000, the Government committed $3.65 billion of the $5.9 billion fiscal provision. It 
also set aside a contingency for further initiatives over three years. Approximately $240 million of this 
has been committed.  
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7.  Challenges facing New Zealand’s Fiscal Policy Framework 
Challenges and ongoing developments can be grouped into short-term fiscal policy 
(primarily the fiscal provisions) and longer-term issues associated with population 
ageing.  
 
7.1  Provisions beyond the parliamentary term 
The provisions framework is established for the three-year parliamentary term.   
However, the fiscal forecasts extend beyond the parliamentary term, more so as the 
term progresses.  Technical provisions are included to ensure a realistic expense 
profile is maintained.  
 
The technical provisions present issues about the transition to the next three-year 
provision, for example, when a government makes decisions that impact beyond the 
horizon of its fiscal provisions.  If the decisions are rising in cost, then these are not 
“counted” against any technical provisions.  This is termed the “bow wave” effect 
(effectively expenditure creep).  In addition, the transition beyond the three-year term 
may result in large changes in provisions as they are finalised.  
 
7.2  Capital provision 
Currently the capital provision is largely based on a bottom-up assessment of likely 
capital requirements.  Uncertainty around long-term investment needs has led to 
changes in the provision as specific needs emerged.  The “sanctions” around the 
capital provision are less transparent than those around the fiscal (operating) 
provisions.  The Government is currently addressing the need for a more 
comprehensive framework that will guide capital investment decisions within sectors 
and across the whole of government.   
 
7.3  Decisions at the margin 
The fiscal provisions focus on the margins of new activity rather than existing spending.  
This may provide weaker incentives on overall spending control depending on whether 
existing programmes are subject to the same degree of scrutiny as proposals under the 
new initiatives spending limit.  These issues are linked to the more generic issue of 
budget management in a surplus environment.  
 
7.4  Institutionalising the fiscal provisions framework 
The provisions provide the Government with an opportunity to credibly demonstrate 
that it is following through on its short-term fiscal intentions.  The operating balance is 
subject to a number of other factors in the short-term and the provisions provide a 
controllable operational target.    
Nonetheless, the provisions framework is an informal control mechanism.  For 
example, in 1999 it was uncertain whether the incoming Coalition Government would 
agree to continue to use the fiscal provisions framework.   Institutionalisation could help 
maintain continuity of the framework from one term of government to the next.   
However, institutionalisation of an informal mechanism that may (and will likely need) to 
change to reflect a changing could be inappropriate.      26
Given the “forecast bias” discussed in Section 6.2, the provisions framework has 
enhanced the credibility of short-term fiscal forecasts.  However, in contrast to GAAP, 
which is externally monitored, the provisions framework is internal to the Government 
and the Treasury.  This creates the potential that increases in spending pressure could 
be met through non-transparent changes in the definition of the provision rather than 
transparent changes in the quantum.  The credibility of the framework may be 
enhanced by an external monitoring mechanism. 
7.5  Allowing for uncertainty 
The current provisions were initially set with reference to the fiscal forecasts in the 
1999 Pre-Election Economic and Fiscal Update.  Setting the provisions with reference 
to the “central” forecast does not adequately allow for the inherent uncertainty 
associated with those forecasts.  The experience of the Asian financial crisis 
demonstrates that while a reaction function can be used to adjust the provisions ex 
post, there may be benefits in allowing for some uncertainty ex ante.  
 
The ex ante budget target framework developed by Buckle et. al. (2001) may provide 
an additional guide to setting both the level and phasing of the fiscal provisions.  Buckle 
et. al. caution that the degree of certainty surrounding the ex ante targets is based on 
the frequency and magnitude of past shocks to the economy.  The FRA and current 
budgetary frameworks may have altered the nature of the fiscal response and shock 
generation mechanisms.  Nonetheless, some reference to historical shocks would 
augment the current forecast scenarios, which are largely based on judgements about 
situation specific conditions.  
 
7.6  Short-term fiscal policy 
Managing within the provisions requires the Government to more explicitly develop a 
policy approach that looks beyond each year’s Budget, so reducing the likelihood of 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy.  The general approach is to allow automatic stabilisers to 
operate and alter the provisions on the basis of what are judged to be longer-lasting 
changes.  
 
7.6.1  The role of the economic cycle 
Fiscal reporting in New Zealand does not require the preparation of cyclically-adjusted 
information (unlike the United Kingdom), although cyclically-adjusted balances are 
published.  The broad similarity of alternative measures of New Zealand’s potential 
output over the 1990s has provided somewhat more confidence in the use of cyclically-
adjusted fiscal balances.29  Nonetheless, history and overseas evidence suggests that 
caution is required in the assessing the underlying fiscal position.  
 
There has been increased international interest in the role of automatic stabilisers in 
cushioning shifts in private sector demand (in the US context, see Cohen and Follete, 
2000; Auerbach and Feenburg, 2000).  For OECD economies, van den Noord (2000) 
assesses the extent to which components of government budgets affected by the 
macroeconomic situation operate to smooth the business cycle.   
 
                                                
29 For a review of alternative measures of New Zealand’s potential output see Claus, Conway 
and Scott (2000).    27
For the United States economy, Taylor (2000) concludes that… “Given the more 
transparent and systematic approach to monetary policy that has been followed in 
recent years, it is more important than ever for fiscal policy to be clearly stated and 
systematic”.  Taylor acknowledges the role of cyclical stabilisers and suggests the 
discretionary focus of fiscal policy should be on longer-term issues (e.g., marginal tax 
rates, population ageing).  
 
7.6.2  Fiscal and monetary policy 
It would not be unreasonable to suggest that the approach suggested by Taylor broadly 
holds in the current New Zealand context.  In the case of the mid-1990s tax reductions 
there was active consultation between monetary and fiscal authorities.  But, formal co-
ordination between monetary and fiscal authorities does not take the form of the 
authorities acting to pursue joint objectives.30  
  
New Zealand’s experience with discretionary fiscal policy during the 1970s and 1980s 
had a significant influence on the formulation of current institutional frameworks and the 
operation of fiscal policy through the 1990s.     
 
Currently, “discretionary” fiscal policy changes are signalled via the three-year fiscal 
provisions and this is seen as assisting the task of setting monetary policy.  In turn, the 
fiscal provisions are set with some reference to the implications for aggregate demand 
and hence monetary policy (see BPS 2000).  
 
Nonetheless, a better understanding of how fiscal policy settings affect the economy 
may be warranted given recent studies investigating the dynamic effects of changes in 
government spending and taxes (for example, see Blanchard and Perotti, 1999).  
 
7.7  Balance sheet issues and changes to financial reporting 
The preparation of a balance sheet and use of GAAP present a number of issues for 
both the reporting of fiscal information and the setting of fiscal policy.  
 
7.7.1  The Crown balance sheet and net worth 
The Crown’s balance sheet includes a range of assets and liabilities.  For example, for 
the year ending June 2000, the unfunded liability of the defined benefit pension 
scheme for government employees was $8.3 billion (compared to gross Crown debt at 
$36 billion).  
 
With lower levels of debt there is increasing focus on the management of the Crown’s 
balance sheet, including the Crown’s attitude to risk.  The emphasis on the balance 
sheet is likely to increase under the proposed NZS Fund, which will involve a build-up 
of financial assets that are currently excluded from the long-term net debt objective (net 
debt is the value of selected financial liabilities less selected financial assets).   
 
                                                
30 See the Reserve Bank of New Zealand submission to the Independent Review of the 
Operation of Monetary Policy, supporting document on “Fiscal and monetary coordination” 
(www.rbnz.govt.nz/monpol/review). The supporting document also explores some of the 
institutional issues surrounding coordination.    28
A number of issues point to an increased focus on gross debt as opposed to net debt.  
These include the proposed build-up of NZS Fund assets plus the role of gross debt as 
an indicator of the amount of funding the government requires from capital markets.  
 
In order to capture changes in the composition of the balance sheet, there may need to 
be clearer specification of the long-term objective for net worth (e.g., whether an 
increase in net worth reflects more financial assets or less debt).      
 
Greater use of the net worth indicator will be assisted by the resolution of 
establishment issues that arose when the Crown’s balance sheet was first prepared in 
1992.  Examples of establishment issues include liability recognition for the accident 
compensation scheme (1999), Public Trust reserves asset recognition (1999) and 
urban state highways asset recognition (the only remaining issue, to be resolved in 
2001).  Establishment issues have led to significant changes in the level of net worth 
and their resolution should facilitate an easier analysis of trends.31   
 
7.7.2  Changes to financial reporting 
Ongoing GAAP developments are likely to see the introduction of greater potential for 
fluctuations resulting from fair value assessments of assets and liabilities altering 
through time.  
 
In accordance with GAAP, full line-by-line consolidation is due to be introduced in the 
2002 Budget.  Under full line-by-line consolidation, “Crown” will include state-owned 
enterprises and Crown entities.  This will not affect reported net worth and the 
operating balance, but individual assets and liabilities will be recorded in the balance 
sheet (with individual revenues and expenses in the operating statement).  This has 
implications for reporting and the specification of some of the long-term fiscal 
objectives (debt and expenses).  A technical discussion document on the issues was 
released earlier this year.    
 
7.8  Time horizons and demographic changes 
Falling debt ratios across the OECD are ushering in a series of new challenges around 
fiscal management in a surplus environment.  The New Zealand experience highlights 
the search for appropriate fiscal anchors and the challenges created by projected 
demographic change.   
 
The Fiscal Responsibility Act does not define the time horizon for the long-term fiscal 
objectives.  However, the Progress Outlooks covering a minimum of ten years require 
projections of the variables specified as long-term objectives.  
 
Longer-term projections of the fiscal position are subject to considerable uncertainty.  
There is uncertainty regarding demographic trends, technological change, behavioural 
responses and the role of future governments.  Nonetheless, population ageing is 
projected to generate a change in the growth of government expenses (see Polackova, 
1997).  Although not required by the FRA, longer-term fiscal scenarios over time 
periods long enough to capture demographic changes (e.g., 50-years) have been a 
feature of fiscal strategy documents.  
 
                                                
31 For example, initial recognition of the outstanding claims obligation for the accident 
compensation scheme had a negative impact on Crown net worth of around $7 billion.    29
In terms of long-term fiscal indicators, generational accounting estimates for New 
Zealand suggest the burden on future generations is projected to fall slightly below that 
on current newborns (Baker, 1999).32  However, the lack of focus on existing 
generations and the complexity of the methodology means the estimates have had 
limited impact on policy decisions.  The FSR 2000 signalled ongoing investigation into 
long-term fiscal indicators, including the “fiscal gap” calculated by Auerbach (1994) and 
the Congressional Budget Office (1999). 
 
The approach taken to funding a “given” future spending path will influence the setting 
over time of long-term fiscal objectives.  For instance, a decision to tax-smooth may 
imply running substantial operating surpluses, followed by an extended period of 
operating deficits.  This would require changes to the long-term operating balance, debt 
and expense objectives.  A balanced budget approach, which entails changes to taxes 
and/or spending, would require modifications to the long-term objective for expenses.   
 
These considerations may require Government’s to signal specific time periods over 
which their long-term fiscal objectives are to hold, or that objectives may need to be 
adjusted as future expense pressures become clearer.    
 
8.  Conclusions 
Fiscal policy in New Zealand has seen a consolidation of the Government’s position 
and significant changes to the institutional framework, in particular, the introduction of 
the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994.   
 
New Zealand’s fiscal policy framework is a function of both historical experience and 
wider public sector reforms.  The framework differs from that used elsewhere, 
especially in its use of legislated “principles of responsible fiscal management” as 
opposed to mandatory targets.  However, the Fiscal Responsibility Act does require 
Governments to set short-term fiscal intentions and long-term fiscal objectives for a 
range of fiscal aggregates. 
   
The 1990s saw a shift to structural surplus and declining debt-to-GDP ratios.  Progress 
toward the stated long-term expense objective, however, was more problematic.  The 
experience of the 1990s highlights three key themes; the tensions created by timeless 
long-term objectives with no clear binding constraint; the uncertainties and tensions in 
adjusting short-term fiscal policy settings; and the emergence of longer-term fiscal 
issues associated with future demographic changes.  With regard to the last of these, 
the FRA framework has increasingly been used to illustrate a range of fiscal issues that 
are broader than those that influenced its original formulation (e.g., fiscal consolidation 
and stabilisation).  
 
The direct contribution of institutional change such as the FRA to the fiscal outcomes of 
the 1990s is unclear.  The Act codified a number of earlier developments that may 
have improved fiscal policy regardless (e.g., through increased transparency).   
Nonetheless, by requiring Governments to be explicit about their short-term intentions 
and long-term objectives the FRA establishes a framework for annual Budget 
decisions.  
 
                                                
32 These estimates are based on 1996 fiscal forecasts with adjustments for higher spending.   30
More recently, the experience of the 1990s has seen the evolution of specific 
operational targets (the fiscal provisions).  The fiscal provisions provide a short-term 
anchor that avoids fluctuations caused by the economic cycle and valuation changes.  
Cyclical and valuation changes complicated the interpretation of outcomes against 
short-term fiscal intentions.     
 
New Zealand’s fiscal policy framework faces a number of challenges and is subject to 
ongoing developments.  For example, the provisions may benefit from a more explicit 
institutional framework.  Although the framework has “opened up” longer term fiscal 
issues, these will present ongoing challenges to the formulation of fiscal policy.   
 
   31
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